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URBANIZATION AND DEMOCRACY IN THE FRAMEWORK OF
MODERNIZATION THEORY: RECENT EMPIRICAL EVIDENCES
The goal of this study is to provide empirical evidence for existence of positive relationship
between urbanization and democracy. We involve a dataset of 56 developing countries covering a
time span between 1982 and 2007. The research hypothesis is that developing countries tend to be
more democratic at higher levels of urbanization. We test this hypothesis within GMM methodo
logical framework and find some evidences. 
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УРБАНІЗАЦІЯ ТА ДЕМОКРАТІЯ У КОНТЕКСТІ ТЕОРІЇ
МОДЕРНІЗАЦІЇ: НОВІ ЕМПІРИЧНІ ДАНІ
Мета даної статті – надати емпіричні дані про існування позитивного зв'язку між
урбанізацією та демократією. Використано дані щодо 56 країн, що розвиваються, для
часового проміжку з 1982 по 2007 рік. Робоча гіпотеза: країни, що розвиваються, більш
схильні до демократії за вищого рівня урбанізації. Гіпотезу перевірено за допомогою
нормальних (гаусових) розподілів, надано докази.
Ключові слова: демократія; модернізація; урбанізація; Polity ІV; гаусів розподіл. 
Табл. 3. Форм. 2. Літ. 35. 
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УРБАНИЗАЦИЯ И ДЕМОКРАТИЯ В КОНТЕКСТЕ ТЕОРИИ
МОДЕРНИЗАЦИИ: НОВЫЕ ЭМПИРИЧЕСКИЕ ДАННЫЕ
Цель данной статьи – предоставить эмпирические данные о существовании
позитивной связи между урбанизацией и демократией. Использованы данные по 56
развивающимся странам и временному отрезку с 1982 по 2007 год. Рабочая гипотеза:
развивающиеся страны более склонны к демократии при высоком уровне урбанизации.
Гипотеза проверена при помощи нормальных (гауссовских) распределений, предоставлены
доказательства. 
Ключевые слова: демократия; модернизация; урбанизация; Polity ІV; гауссово распределение.
Introduction. The issue of interlinks between socioeconomic development and
democracy can be seen as a nexus of social and political sciences. Indeed, this topic
incorporates a large set of gnoseological and methodological questions. These ques
tions rise from the impact of development processes on social institutions, mecha
nisms and values and deal especially with causality between what is generally labeled
as "modernization" and "democracy". However, the answers are far from being unani
mous and range from postulating that causal relationship flows from modernization
to democracy, to the idea that democratic countries are more conducive to modern
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ization and economic development, but democracy itself occurs exogenously. Finally,
other approaches either fail to find any connection or even sustain the existence of a
negative relationship between key determinants of modernization, especially the eco
nomic growth, and democracy.
This study has its research grounds in Lipset (1959, 1960, and 1994) and deals
with structural and societal conditions that can act as democratic stimulators. Its goal
is to examine some recent empirical evidences regarding possible connections
between a specific aspect of modernization – urbanization – and the democratic sta
tus for a set of developing countries.
The study is structured as follows: the next section reviews the literature, dis
cussing its grounds and recent evolutions. The third section describes the interna
tional data and the involved variables. The empirical results are reported in the fourth
section. Finally, the conclusions are drawn, some analytical limitations are highlight
ed and possible further research directions are suggested.
Modernization and democracy. The modern analysis of democracy, as an out
come of longrun driving forces of modernization, starts with the seminal work of
Lipset (1959, 1960, and 1994). The key idea is that there is a relevant association
between the level of development of a given country and its probability of being dem
ocratic: "the more welltodo a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain
democracy" (Lipset, 1959:75). Regarding such association, the intended interpreta
tion is a broad one "all the various aspects of economic development – industrializa
tion, urbanization, wealth, and education – are so closely interrelated as to form one
major factor which has the political correlation of democracy" (Lipset, 1960:41) and,
thus, it cannot be reduced to the postulate of a simple connection between social
incomes and democracy. Still, it should be noted that economic development features
can be seen as factors of democracy, but not necessarily as causal determinants.
Lipset's analysis was germinating a large body of literature which is accepting,
amending or rejecting the involved assumptions (for a comprehensive synthesis of this
literature, see Wucherpfennig and Deutsch, 2009; Lupu and Murali, 2009).
Several explanations have been advanced at theoretical level for sustaining the
implied transmission channels (see, for a discussion, Uysal et al., 2010). Firstly, the
emergence of middle class and increase in educational opportunities are viewed as
determinants for both economic growth and democracy (Lipset, 1994). Secondly,
modernization contributes to the rise of democratic demands from the working class
(Landman, 1999, 2003). Thirdly, transformations in allocation of "land, income, and
capital" associated with modernization (Boix and Stokes, 2003) can be seen as
grounds for democracy. Various empirical evidences have been provided for such
channels, suggesting that socioeconomic and political developments are positively
correlated (Inglehart, 1997, Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Muller, 1988, 1995; Barro,
1999; Vanhanen, 1997). However, there are other studies which fail to sustain such
correlation (Arat, 1988; Hadenius, 1992). Glasure et al. (1999) argue that there is a
certain tradeoff between economic development and democracy according to the
initial levels of economic development.
Among these recent developments in the field, perhaps, some of the most con
troversial ones are the critics of Przeworski and Limongi (1997) and Przeworski et al.
(2000) which formulate a distinction between the endogenous and, respectively, exoge
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nous versions of democracy. In the first version, social and economic development
leads to democratic evolution. In the second version, development merely helps to
sustain democracy, once it is exogenously established. Postulating that democracy
arises with equal chances regardless the economic development levels, these studies
reject the endogenous version and emphasize that development is lowering the distri
butional inequalities and, thus, is attenuating the social tension by greater stability of
the already established democratic regimes. However, Boix and Stokes (2003) point
out a number of shortcomings and argue that even if initially the democratic archi
tecture is initially exogenously settled, in the long run the countries are more likely to
remain democratic at the increased levels of economic development. Thus, if such
development is long enough, this is no more a transition process and the relationship
between democracy and growth becomes stable. Supplementary, their study provides
a more detailed argumentation according to which "democracy is caused not by
income per se but by other changes that accompany development, in particular,
income equality" (Boix and Stokes, 2003:540). Also, Inglehart and Welzel (2005)
debate on the issue of political stability and estimate the ratio of regime shifts to
democracy versus regime shifts to autocracy for different levels of per capita GDP.
The outcome of their analysis strongly supports the thesis that modernization
increases the probability of transition to democracy. In the mean time, they are
advancing the idea that if a broader view on democracy is considered by taking into
account a large set of political and civil rights and the extent to which these are
respected by elites, the analysis can be enriched by considering the cultural determi
nants of social subjects' preferences for democratic institutions and mechanisms.
This study seeks to contribute to the empirical literature on the topic by focusing
on a specific aspect of modernization: the urbanization process. 2 arguments are justi
fying this choice. Firstly, we consider that urban areas are providing an agglomeration
rent, such as the existence of "thick" markets (both consumer and labor markets), ease
of access to these markets, and the resulting, socalled forward and backward linkages
with large local markets (Baldwin et al., 2003). As a consequence, urbanization can
influence democracy through its impact on economic development. Secondly, we
argue that urbanization stimulates the changes towards emancipative values due to its
educational and occupational differences and to its contribution to individual auton
omy (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). In other words: "no bourgeoisie, no democracy''
(Moore, 1966). Of course, "bourgeoisie" is used here not in classes' terms but rather as
a modernization agent. Heavily drawing on this literature, our research hypothesis can
be formulated as: Developing countries tend to be more democratic at higher levels of
urbanization seen both as an outcome as a well as driving force of modernization.
International Data. In order to employ an operational measure of the democrat
ic status, we are using the Polity IV data provided by the Center for Systemic Peace –
Polity IV Project (http://www.systemicpeace.org/). The unit of analysis is the "polity."
Eckstein and Gurr (1975, 26) provide a "simple, general definition of all "polities" (or
"governments") as subsets of the class of "authority patterns" and further point out
that "all authority patterns are "equivalents" of stateorganizations". The underline
conceptual framework of this measure examines concomitant qualities of democrat
ic and autocratic authority in governing institutions, rather than discreet and mutu
ally exclusive forms of governance. The institutionalized democracy elements con
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sidered are concerning: 1) the presence of institutions and procedures through which
citizens can express their preferences on alternative policies and leaders; 2) the exis
tence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by an executive; 3) the
guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political par
ticipation. The Polity IV Institutionalized Democracy is an additive 11point scale (0
10). The POLITY score is computed by subtracting the "autocracy" score from the
"democracy" score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly dem
ocratic) to 10 (strongly autocratic). The Revised Combined Polity Score is a modified
version of the POLITY variable. It modifies the annual POLITY score by applying a
simple treatment, or "fix" to convert instances of "standardized authority scores" (i.e.,
66, 77, and 88) to conventional polity scores (i.e., within the range of 10 to +10).
This perspective envisions a spectrum of governing authority that spans from fully
institutionalized autocracies through mixed, or incoherent, authority regimes
(termed "anocracies") to fully institutionalized democracies. Due to its unique per
spective, the Polity IV measure of democracy fits into our focus of democracy as a
process rather than a societal configuration.
As for the degree of urbanization, we measure it in a typical manner as the popu
lation living in an area classified as "urban", by involving the World Bank (2010) data.
Of course, this measure is rather rough; however it captures the nature of urban envi
ronments (the intrinsic characteristics of the urbanicity). Nonetheless, it can be seen
as a broad enough proxy serving the limited analytical purposes of the present study.
The data are covering a time span between 1982 and 2007 for a sample of 56
countries classified as low and middle income ones. Such an observation period
allows us to identify the dynamics of institutional changes and to reflect the adjust
ments in the implied transmission channels.
Table 1 displays the main statistic characteristics of the data. The corresponding
values of the distributional parameters suggest that there is some crosssection het
erogeneity of the sample. Thus, the estimation methodology should account for such
heterogeneity as this is generated by the unequal levels of political and institutional
development.
Table 1. Main statistic characteristics of the dataset
Methodology and empirical results. A formal description of our research hypoth
esis can be synthesized as:
(1)
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 Polity IV Urbanization 
Mean -0.96 15.30 
Median -2.24 15.10 
Maximum 10.00 19.61 
Minimum -10.00 11.55 
Standard Deviation 5.65 1.57 
Skewness 0.42 0.19 
Kurtosis 1.94 2.91 
Jarque-Bera 110.15 9.34 
Probability 0.00 0.01 
Observations 1456 1456 
.,,0, tiittiiti XPolity εηδββ ++++=
Here, the dependent Polity IV variable is linked to a set X of the considered
explanatory variables. ηi is the unobserved timeinvariant specific effects; δt captures
a common deterministic trend; εit is a random disturbance assumed to be normal, and
identical distributed (IID) with E (εit) = 0; Var (εit) =σ2 > 0. 
As a first step in testing our research hypothesis, we are involving a static panel
data model with pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects (FE) and random
effects (RE) estimators. The Fstatistics tests the null hypothesis of the same specific
effects for all countries. If we accept the null hypothesis, we could use the OLS esti
mator. The Hausman test can decide which model is better: random effects (RE) or
fixed effects (FE). The FE model was selected because it avoids the inconsistency due
to correlation between the explanatory variables and the countryspecific effects.
The results are given in Table 2. The values of the Hausman tests confirm the via
bility of the inclusion of the fixed effects. It appears that the level of urban population
is positive and statistic significant associated with the Polity IV measure of democrat
ic societal stance.
Table 2. Democracy and urbanization: a static panel data model 
(dependent: Polity IV)
tstatistics (heteroskedasticity corrected) in round brackets. 
***/**/* – statistically significant respectively at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
For robustness assessment, we also apply the socalled GMM system estimation.
The GMM system methodology – as proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell
and Bond (1998, 2000) and Windmeijer (2005) – is involved because estimators like
fixed and random effects, IV or standard GMM may yield to biased results. Also, since
a small panel sample may produce "downward bias of the estimated asymptotic stan
dard errors" in the twostep procedure (Baltagi, 2008:154), we use the "Windmeijer cor
rection" for the estimated standard errors. More exactly, Windmeijer (2000, 2005)
observes that part of downward bias which can appear for standard errors in small sam
ples is due to extra variation caused by the initial weight matrix estimation being based
on consistent estimates of the equation parameters. In order to correct this bias, it is
possible to calculate biascorrected standard error estimates which take into account
the variation of the initial parameter estimates. We employ a version of this correction
applicable for GMM models estimated using the iteratetoconvergence procedure.
There are several advantages of the GMM over other static or dynamic panel
estimation methods. Among these: static panel estimates, as the OLS models, are
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Explanatory Fixed Effects t-Statistics Significance 
Polity (t-1) 1.19 48.16 *** 
Polity (t-2) -0.22 8.83 *** 
Urban population (natural logarithm) 0.03 2.07 ** 
Cross-section F-test 1.90 (p=0.00)   
Cross-section chi-square 99.34 (p=0.00)   
Period F-test 4.74(p=0.00)   
Period chi-square 120.50(p=0.00)   
Cross-section / Period F 2.72(p=0.00)   
Cross-section / Period chi-square 203.26(p=0.00)   
R2 0.99   
Observations (balanced) 1352   
subjected to the problem of dynamic panel bias (Bond, 2002); in our database, we
have 56 countries (N) analyzed over the period of 26 years (T) and the literature
includes several arguments for dynamic panel model being designed especially for a
situation where "T" is smaller than "N" in order to control for dynamic panel bias
(Bond, 2002; Baltagi, 2008); the problem of potential endogeneity can be easier
addressed in dynamic panel models than in static and OLS models, since all variables
from the regression which are not correlated with the error term (including lagged
and differenced variables) can be potentially used as valid instrumental variables; the
dynamic panel model is able to identify short and longrun involved effects (Baltagi,
2008). Also, the GMM system exploits the stationarity restrictions, while the first
differenced GMM estimator can behave poorly when the time series are persistent.
The GMM system tries to estimate the Equation 1 simultaneously with a re
specification designed to eliminate the countryspecific effects by using first differ
ences of the involved variables as:
(2)
Z is a set of instruments for the dependent and explanatory variables. The GMM
system approach estimates equations (1) and (2) simultaneously by using lagged lev
els and lagged differences as instruments. The presence of both lagged levels and dif
ferences is justified by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998)
which showed that lagged levels can be poor instruments for firstdifferenced vari
ables, particularly if the variables are "persistent". For comparison purposes, we are
reporting the results of a dynamic GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991).
Furthermore, we are considering as control variables some proxies for political con
ditions of the democracy. The inclusion of such variables is for examining the arguments
of Huntington (1968) who states that a level of political mobilization within a society
which exceeds the level of institutional development (which can be the case of some
developing countries) can jeopardize the social stability. 2 control variables are: Political
Rights indices and Political Globalization index. The Political Rights and the Civil Liberties
indices are reported by Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org). The ratings process is
based on the checklist of 10 political rights questions and 15 civil liberties questions. The
political rights questions are grouped into 3 subcategories: Electoral Process (3 ques
tions), Political Pluralism and Participation (4), and Functioning of Government (3). Raw
points are awarded to each of these questions on the scale from 0 to 4, where 0 points is
the lowest degree and 4 is the highest degree of rights or liberties present. 
The political rights section contains as well 2 additional discretionary questions:
question A ("For traditional monarchies that have no parties or electoral process,
does the system provide genuine, meaningful consultation with people, encourage
public discussion of policy choices, and allow the right to petition the ruler?") and
question B ("Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic
composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political bal
ance in favor of another group?"). For additional discretionary question A, 1 to 4
points may be added, as applicable, while for discretionary question B, 1 to 4 points
may be subtracted (the worse the situation is, the more points may be subtracted). The
highest number of points that can be awarded to the political rights checklist is 40 (up
to 4 points for each of 10 questions). Political Globalization index is a component of
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the KOF Index of Globalization (Dreher, 2006). This index is the weighted score of the
following variables: Embassies in Country (25%), Membership in International
Organizations (28%), Participation in U.N. Security Council Missions (22%) and, respec
tively, International Treaties (25%).
Table 3 shows the results of the extended model. The first and the most impor
tant of them is that the urbanization variable remains positive and statistically signif
icant, being robust both to changes in methodology as well as to the inclusion of con
trol variables. However, the estimation of relative importance of urbanization seems
to be sensitive to such changes and the statistical significance decline in the GMM
system framework.
All the control variables are also statistically significant. For Political Rights index the
negative sign indicates a normal positive correlation between higher levels of such right
and democracy since each pair of political rights and civil liberties ratings is averaged to
determine an overall status of "Free," "Partly Free," or "Not Free." Those whose ratings
average 1.0 to 2.5 are considered Free, 3.0 to 5.0 Partly Free, and 5.5 to 7.0 Not Free.
Table 3. Democracy and urbanization: a GMM system and dynamic 
GMM estimation (dependent: Polity IV)
tstatistics (heteroskedasticity corrected) are in round brackets. 
***/**/* – statistically significant respectively at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
M1 and M2 are tests for firstorder and secondorder serial correlation in the
firstdifferenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N (0,1) under the null
hypothesis of no serial correlation (based on robust 2step GMM estimators). Sargan
is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2, under the
null of instruments' validity (2step estimators). White period instrument weighting
matrix and White period standard errors & covariance (no degree of freedom correc
tion) are used for dynamic GMM.
Similarly, there is a positive correlation between democracy and political glob
alization for the considered dataset. It is also interesting to note that their relative
importance is preserved regardless the dynamic or GMM system estimation method.
Conclusions, comments and further research. The purpose of this study was to
examine the empirical evidences supporting the thesis that urbanization, as a mod
ernization driving force, leads to superior levels of societies' democratic status. We
found on a sample of 56 developing countries that such thesis can hold in the long run
even when the political conditions of democratic processes are considered. However,
there are some clear limitations of the present study. Firstly, the results appear to be
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Explanatory Dynamic GMM GMM-System 
Polity (t-1) 1.11*** (361.91) 1.12*** (17.50) 
Polity (t-2) -0.12*** (35.03) -0.17*** (2.85) 
Urban population 
(natural logarithm) 
0.10*** (30.76) 0.21** (2.58) 
Political Globalization 0.003*** (42.90) 0.005* (1.68) 
Political Rights -0.006***(12.40) -0.11***(3.20) 
M1  -1.81 (0.07) 
M2  1.50(0.13) 
Sargan 1.00 1.00 
Observations (balanced) 1300 1341 
sensitive to the chosen estimation methodology. Secondly, the proxy used for esti
mating the degree of urbanization provides only a broad picture and does not reflect
the conditions in which urbanization itself takes place. Thirdly, the study assumes an
empirical approach and do not provide any insights about the underlying mecha
nisms. At least several questions can be raised such as: does urbanization contribute
to the democratic improvements by stimulating the emergence of politically active
social groups? Is such political activism necessarily oriented towards democratic
goals? Is there any payoff for urbanization in terms of democratic costs (such as an
increase in social polarities)? Can the political conditions of democracy be seen as
components of the modernization processes or they appear as outcomes of such
processes? What are the aspects of democracy more susceptible to be influenced by
urbanization and how are they reflected by the used indices? To answer these ques
tions, several methodological tasks must be fulfilled: political participation proxies
should be involved and their connections with urbanization should be analyzed; eco
nomic consequences of urbanization should be highlighted in terms of economic
growth as well as in terms of social outcomes' distribution; the results should be
checked against various methodologies of measuring democracy and a measure of
democratic stability post urbanization should be involved as dependent and so on.
Fourthly, urbanization is only a part of the story since modernization implies a whole
spectrum of social, economic, politic and cultural evolutions that cannot be captured
by simple dynamics of urban population. Even more, urbanization itself can con
tribute to such evolutions by the impact exercised on economic growth and human
development. Thus, a more sound analysis should provide a methodology able to
highlight the dominant causality.
But despite these caveats, we think such empirical studies can serve to the con
struction of a more robust explanatory framework for coping with complex issues
raised by the analysis of the twin processes of modernization and democracy.
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